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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages resulting
from the spillage by Appellant, Louis A. Roser Company's,
agent of a goat serum conjugate developed for commercial
laboratory diagnostic purposes.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
In December, 1977, a District Court jury found
that Respondent, Gull Laboratories, Inc. 's, damages
amounted to $65,197.00 and that said damages resulted
70% from the negligence of Roser Company.

Judgment was

entered for Gull Laboratories in the amount of $45,637.90,
plus costs.

Roser Company's motion for a new trial was

denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, Louis A. Roser Company, seeks

a

reversal of the judgment of the lower court and a new trial
on all issues.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The incident giving rise to this lawsuit
occurred at Gull Laboratories, Inc. in Sandy, Utah, in
the latter part of February, 1976.

Dr. Myron W. Wentz is

the director and principal stockholder of that organization.
Gull Laboratories, Respondent herein, had
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engaged in scientific research from 1974 until the
incident in question in 1976, developing a unique goat
serum conjugate for use by hospitals, clinics and laboratories in a test kit to be used in diagnosing certain
diseases.

(R497).
In February, 1976, the kits were nearing readi-

ness for introduction on the connnercial market (R506) when
the walk-in cooler in which the conjugate was being stored
became defective, causing a potentially harmful temperature rise in the cooler.

(R528, 697).

Dr. Wentz called

Fur Breeders Agricultural Cooperative, from whom Gull
Laboratories leased the laboratory.

Fur Breeders sent

representatives who entered the cooler to check the
refrigeration tmit.

(R593).

They neither discovered the

defect nor caused any damage to the conjugates or reagents
stored in the cooler.

(R528, 720-24).

Subsequently, Fur Breeders called Louis A. Roser
Company and asked Roser Company to send someone to repair
the tmit.

Roser Company then sent their "lead serviceman''

(R676) to the laboratory on a Friday afternoon in February,
1976.

Mr. Meyer, the repairman, testified that he wore

corrective lenses because of cataracts and that his vision
was a little fuzzy or cloudy (R653-54) and that he suffered
from nerve deafness, making it difficult for him to hear.
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(R658-59).

There is a conflict of testimony concerning

how he got to the cooler; he claims he went to the cooler
without anyone showing him to it.

(R659).

However, it

is uncontested that when he left, a flask containing the
goat serum conjugate, the result of months of research
and development, was tipped over and the conjugate lost
due to spillage.

(R536, 672a-73a, 693, 702).

Meyer left

the laboratory, he spoke to no one and thereafter denied
any negligence or responsibility (R667-668) in the spillage
of the conjugate.

The jury in its verdict determined

the facts to be otherwise.
Roser Company claims that the evidence is
conflicting as to whether the conjugate was totally lost.
(Brief of Appellant, Page 9).

In fact, the only direct

testimony by eye witnesses was to the effect that virtually
all of the conjugate was spilled.

(R538).

In rebuttal,

a competitor of Gull Laboratories, Dr. Muna, (R710a)
testified that it might not have been a total loss, even
though he was not a witness to the spillage.

There is, in

fact, no evidence that Dr. Muna was ever in Gull Laboratories
at all.

Dr. Wentz innnediately called Fur Breeders who
said they would get him in touch with the proper people.
(R538-39).

Soon thereafter, a representative of Roser's
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insurance company met with Dr. Wentz and prepared a three
page estimate of what Dr. Wentz then thought it might cost
to reproduce the spilled conjugate.

(R578-82).

A single

page of that estimate, Exhibit D-16, was introduced by
Roser Company as evidence of Gull Laboratories' loss.
(R581).

At the trial, Dr. Wentz testified that the actual

cost of reproducing the conjugate came to $65,197.00.
He testified as to specific costs making up that figure
(R559-61) and Roser Company had the opportunity to crossexamine him concerning the component and total cost.
(R577-78).

Exhibit P-13 was introduced as an itemization

of those figures.

Whether the actual loss was the amount

contained in the insurance company's estimate, Exhibit D-16
or the amount testified to by Dr. Wentz from actual
experience and itemized in Exhibit P-13, was a question of
fact which was decided by the jury in favor of Gull
Laboratories.
Roser Company has claimed that it was surprised
by the testimony of Dr. Wentz regarding the actual amount
of damages.

(Brief of Appellant, Page 23).

Roser Company

had made no effort to discover this amount, even after Dr.
Wentz stated in his deposition in November, 1976, that he
had spent considerable time and money to replace the lost
conjugate.

Contrary to Roser Company's contention, (Brief
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of Appellant, Page 28) attempts to reirnmunize the animals
began in March, 1976, and continued throughout the summer.
(R557).

Wentz further stated that his attempt to render

conjugates adequate for his purposes was" ... the thrust
of my efforts since the accident, since the loss of the
other material."

(R272).

Roser Company made no formal

or informal requests to examine the records of Gull
Laboratories concerning the loss resulting from the spillage
and the resultant damages at anytime prior to trial.
Such information could have been readily provided by
Dr. Wentz since he personally directed the work of
recovery (R556-59) and, contrary to the contention of
Roser Company (Brief of Appellant, Page 18), he kept the
records of Gull Laboratories' operations.

(R577).

A

statement made by Roser Company's counsel before the jury
on this subject was somewhat misleading.

The court asked

if Exhibit P-13 was a summation of what was on the books
and records of Gull Laboratories.

When Mr. Richman replied

that it was, Roser's counsel said, (R560, lines 5-6):
MR. BERRY:

I don't think its on the books
and records, Your Honor. I
haven't seen it on the books.

The implication was that he had reviewed the books
and records and had not found that information.

The fact is,

he had never seen those records because he had never asked
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to see. them prior to that moment.

Those records, neverthe-

less, existed and were prepared by and under the direction
of Dr. Wentz who was able to give competent testimony
concerning their contents.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
The Utah Supreme Court has said, in Crellin v.
Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264 (1952):

"The granting

of a new trial should never be merely capricious and
arbitrary, but should only be done when sound judicial
discretion, in the interest of doing justice between the
parties, so requires."

Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure defines the limits of such discretion,
stating that the following are the pertinent grounds for
granting a new trial:
Rule 59(a) Grounds

***
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for
the party making the application, which he
could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence
of passion or prejudice.
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(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify
the verdict or other decision, or that it is
against the law.
(7) Error in law.
Granting a new trial for reasons not circumscribed by the above mentioned rule would "prostitute the
constitutional trial by jury."

See Jensen v. Denver & R.

G. Ry. Co., 138 Pac. 1185, 1192 (Utah, 1914); Uptown
Appliance & Radio Co., Inc. v. Flint, 122 Utah 298, 249
P.2d826 (1952).
POINT I
THERE WAS NO ERROR COMMITTED BY THE COURT
IN RECEIVING EXHIBIT P-13 IN EVIDENCE.
Roser Company claims that Gull Laboratories is
"now estopped to deny its claim that P-13 is a summary
and is consequently bound by the law pertaining thereto."
(Brief of Appellant, Page 15).

Whether that exhibit was

or was not a summary is immaterial and Gull Laboratories can
certainly not be estopped from claiming other grounds
for the propriety of such evidence.

Roser Company claims

that such exhibit was improperly admitted as violating
the best evidence rule.

However, it is clear as set forth

in 2 JONES, EVIDENCE, §7.4 (6th ed., 1972), p. 96, that the
best evidence rule does not apply:
§7.4.

Distinction Between Proof of Contents
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and Proof of Facts Asserted in Writing. While the instrument itself is the best
evidence, and, if available, the only
evidence of what it contains, it often
happens that the recitals of the instrument
are hearsay, such as the narration of events
in a letter. In such cases the writing
itself is not admissible to prove the truth
of its recitals unless it can qualify under
an exception to the hearsay rule. Thus
two distinct rules are involved, thec5ne
relating to proof of what the instrument
contains and the other relatin to the
pro ative e ect o its recitals. The best
evidence rule a lies onl in the case of
t e
So i the writin is admissible
to
acts w ic are recited therein,
not ave greater weig t t an
ru e oes not a
, an oral
testimony an the writing are equally
admissible except as limitations may be
imposed by some other exclusionary rule of
evidence.
Furthermore, there is no preferential
rule which requires the production of the
writing if the fact to be proved is an
independent fact to which the writing is
merely collateral or circumstantially
relevant . . . . " (Emphasis added).
The legal principal thus stated has been followed
generally in jurisdictions throughout the United States.
Illustrative of this is an Illinois case where the Plaintiff
attempted to show certain expenses as damages.

It will

be noted that in this case, Respondent introduced Exhibit
P-13 also to show certain expenses as damages.

The Illinois

court stated in Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust
Company of Chicago v. Eastern Illinois Water Co., 31 Ill.
App. 3rd 148, 334 N.E.2d 96, 105-06 (1975):
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At the trial, in order to prove
expenses incurred by plaintiffs as a result
of defendant's default on the mortgage,
plaintiffs introduced a number of letters
which had been sent to defendant by plaintiffs. The letters were nothing more than
written notice of expenses which plaintiffs
claimed pursuant to one or more provisions
of the mortgage. Defendant at the trial
objected to the admission of the exhibits
as not competent because not the best
evidence. The exhibits were admitted
over defendant's objections. On this
appeal defendant renews its contention
that the exhibits were incompetent because
not the best evidence . . . .
Defendant misunderstands the purpose
and application of the best evidence rule.
The best evidence rule applies only when the
contents or terms of a writin~ are in
issue and are, therefore, t o e roved.
Citations . In the instant case t e issue
was not the contents of a writing but
rather the amount of ex~enses that had
been incurred b
laintiffs. The best
evidence ru e oes not a~p y where a ~arty
seeks to rove a fact whictlhas an existence
in eten ent o any writing, even though
theact might have been reduced to, or is
evidenced by, a writing." (Citations).
(Emphasis added).
It is clear that the principles set forth in
JONES and Continental Illinois are applicable to the question
before this court and that it is a misapprehension of
the issues to contend that Exhibit P-13 is not admissible
because it does not meet the requirements as an exception
to the best evidence rule.

In Schiltz v. Cullen-Schiltz

& Associates, Inc., 228 N.W.2d 10, 19-20 (Iowa, 1975),

-9-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plaintiff tendered a "rundown" of costs and wages.

The

defendant contended that the plaintiff had in his possession receipts, vouchers, agreements or some form of
written evidence which would better prove the elements
of damage he testified to.

On appeal, the court disagreed,

saying:
The authors of McCormick on Evidence
(Second Ed.), Section 229, say, "the only
actual rule that the 'best evidence' phrase
denotes today is the rule requiring the
production of the writing."
Rule of best evidence obtainable is
expressly, if not solely, applicable to
documentary evidence, (Citation), and has no
application where the fact to be proved is
independent of any writing even though the
fact has been reduced to a writing or is
evidenced by a writing. (Citations).
The rule excludes testimony designed
to establish the terms of a document, and
requires the document's production instead,
but does not exclude testimony which
concerns the document without aiming to
establish its terms.
(Citations).
In Lin Manufacturing Company of Arkansas v.
Courson, 436 S.W.2d 472 (Ark. 1969), the court quoted
McKelvey on Evidence, 1944 Ed., at §345 as saying:
"There is a distinction between proving a fact which has
been put in writing and proving the writing itself.

Because

a fact has been described in writing does not exclude other
proof of the fact."

(Emphasis added).

The trial court was aware of the distinction
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between the issues as perceived by Roser Company and as
they actually were.

Roser Company's objection was based

on the best evidence rule.

Objection was made to the

introduction of P-13 as follows:
MR. BERRY:

Your honor, I object to P-13
as not being the best evidence
of the books and move his answer
be stricken as not responsive
as to showing that he had information firsthand on which he could
make this summary.

The court responded as follows:
THE COURT:

Based on that objection, I'll
overrule it; the exhibit may be
admitted.
(R561).

It appears, as in the Continental Illinois
case that Roser Company "misunderstands the purpose and
application of the best evidence rule ... In the instant
case the issue was not the contents of a writing but rather
the amount of expenses that had been incurred by plaintiff."
In such a case, the best evidence rule is inapplicable and
we need not concern ourselves with compliance with the
requirements for allowing an exception thereto.

The writing,

Exhibit P-13, was as admissible as evidence as the oral
testimony of Dr. Wentz concerning the subject matter covered
by the writing.
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POINT II
EVEN IF EXHIBIT P-13 WERE INADMISSIBLE,
RECEIVING IT AS EVIDENCE WOULD ONLY BE
HARMLESS ERROR.
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads:
No error in either the admission or
the exclusion of evidence, and no error or
defect in any ruling or order or in anything
done or admitted by the court or by any
of the parties, is ground for granting a new
trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment
or order, unless refusal to take such action
appears to the court inconsistent with substantial ·ustice. The court at ever sta e
error
o t e rocee in must isre ar
or e ect in t e procee ing w ic
oes not
affect the substantial rights of the parties.
(Emphasis added).
Exhibit P-13 itemized the costs of reproduction
of the lost conjugate.

Oral testimony could properly

have been, and in fact was·, presented by Dr. Wentz
concerning such costs.

Company records were maintained

by Dr. Wentz and the costs were incurred in work performed
under his direction.

He was qualified to express his

knowledge verbally concerning the value of material and
labor involved.

Such evidence could properly have been,

and was, placed before the jury by oral testimony.

The

acceptance of Exhibit P-13, even if erroneous, could have
had very little effect, if any, on the substantial rights
of the Roser Company.

Its acceptance by the court was not

inconsistent with the substantial justice required by Rule 61.
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POINT III
ORDINARY PRUDENCE WOULD HAVE ENABLED
ROSER COMPANY TO KNOW UPON WHAT FACTS
GULL LABORATORIES BASED ITS CLAIM FOR
RELIEF
Roser Company's counsel, who introduced Exhibit
D-16, which Gull Laboratories' counsel had never seen,
without prior indication to Gull Laboratories that he
would do so, complains that he was surprised by Gull
Laboratories' introduction of Exhibit P-13.

Exhibit

D-16 was an estimate prepared before the fact, of what Dr.
Wentz thought it would cost to reproduce the conjugate.
It was prepared for the purpose of making a claim against
the Roser Company's insurance company.

Although it was

rejected by Roser Company, Roser Company contends now that
the figures contained in that estimate are more reasonable
than the actual costs of reproduction, precisely determined
after the fact.

If such were the case, it might be ordinary

prudence to neglect the normal and ordinary discovery
procedures available to all parties to a lawsuit, e.g.,
interrogatories and production of documents.

However, it is

difficult to believe that for the purpose of computing
damages, an ordinarily prudent person would accept an
estimate of costs to be incurred as more reliable and accurate
than a statement of costs actually incurred.
It is very cormnon practice to ask opposing parties
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upon interrogatories, to state the evidentiary basis for
any claim or defense which they propose to present at
trial.

However, no interrogatory of any kind was served

upon Gull Laboratories in preparation for the trial of this
matter.

Furthermore, Roser Company did not move, formally

under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or informally by
a request directly to Gull Laboratories or its counsel
for production of any record of any kind kept by Gull
Laboratories.

It can scarcely be argued under such circum-

stances that ordinary prudence was exercised in that aspect
of Roser Company's trial preparation.
Roser Company cites at length from Crellin v.
Thomas, supra, in support of its claim that a new trial
should be granted because ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against the receipt of Exhibit P-13.

There are

adequate legal and factual distinctions to disregard that
case in this matter.

In Crellin, there was no allegation

that one party had surprised the other with evidence
presented at trial.

The party moving for the new trial had,

in fact, discovered new evidence after the trial that would
have helped its case at the trial.

It is true that the

trial court granted a new trial and was upheld on appeal
although it was noted that the moving party might have
discovered the evidence through Rule 33 discovery.

In
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that case, the Defendant was sued for slander after calling
the Plaintiff a whore.

The newly discovered evidence

tended to prove that she was, and the Supreme Court obviously
recognized the injustice involved in permitting the plaintiff
to recover a verdict.

It held that the trial court had

not abused its discretion in allowing a new trial.
such injustice would result in this case.

No

Furthermore,

this case is not governed by Crellin in that no new evidence
has been proffered.
Roser Company's counsel cites testimony of Dr.
Wentz (Brief of Appellant, Page 16) in his deposition and
at the trial to show that he was surprised by the introduction of evidence that the cost to reproduce the conjugate
was $65,197.00.

However, Dr. Wentz' deposition (R271) clearly

puts Roser Company on notice that such costs were not minimal.
After testifying about having discovered a conjugate that
could be obtained from a cotmnercial supplier, the following
exchange took place:

Q.

Did you know about the availability
of that anti-human gobulin product
from the Baltimore laboratory before
you had this accident?

A.

No, I did not. I had to determine
myself and to work with the material
m self to make it acce table for use
in the product.
Emphasis ad ed .

After asking several questions concerning the
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methodology of making the material acceptable, this
exchange concluded as follows:

(R272).

Q.

How much labor and time did you
spend at your lab, yourself, in
working on this after the accident
to render this material more specific
for your purpose?

A.

This has been the thrust of my efforts
since the accident, since the loss of
the other material.
(Emphasis added).

The logical result of granting the relief sought
by Roser Company on this appeal would be for attorneys to
neglect all discovery in their trial preparation, and then
request a new trial on the groi.md that all damaging
evidence produced at the trial was a surprise.
POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY
THE VERDICT AND THE DAMAGES AWARDED
WERE NOT EXCESSIVE
There was ample evidence presented to support
the verdict and to sustain the award of damages.

Roser

Company's witnesses did counter much of Gull Laboratories'
evidence but all evidence was before the jury and it found in
favor of Gull Laboratories.
Although Roser Company claims that "uncontroverted
evidence given during the trial aptly illustrates Meyer's
compliance ... [with the standard of care required of a
reasonable and prudent person]", (Brief of Appellant,
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Page 24), this ignores the facts as set forth at the trial.

Mr. Carpenter, an employee of Gull Laboratories,
testified to the careless habits of Roser Company's
agent, Mr. Meyer and to the fact that he discovered the
spillage after Meyer had left the walk-in refrigerator
(R693) and that the conjugate had not been spilled prior
to that time.

(R694).

This testimony was corroborated by Mrs. Wentz
(R702) who was working in the office at the time the
spillage occurred.

In addition, Dr. Wentz testified

in more detail concerning what appeared to be the careless
habits of Meyer (R527-31) and the fact that the conjugate
was intact prior to Meyer entering the refrigerator and
that it was spilled and totally unsalvageable after he
left (R531-38, 672a-73a).
Although, as Roser Company points out, this
evidence was challenged by statements of Meyer, the
determination of this issue is within the responsibility
of the jury and it, on the basis of the considerable
evidence before it, decided this question of liability
against Roser Company and in favor of Gull Laboratories.
With respect to the contention that the award of
damages was excessive upon the evidence, such a position,
again, is not sustained by the record.

Dr. Wentz testified
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in great detail concerning the unique quality of his product
(R544-52) and his efforts to reproduce the conjugate in a
quality equal to that of the spilled conjugate (R556-59) and
the costs involved in doing so (R559-61).

The unique

quality of Dr. Wentz' conjugate was corroborated by Dr.
Spendlove, a virologist on the faculty at Utah State
University, (R64la-45a) and Dr. Robbins, Supervisor of the
Immuno Chemistry Lab at the L.D.S. Hospital in Salt Lake
City.

(R66la).
Roser Company again countered this evidence con-

cerning damages with testimony from Dr. Wentz' competitor,
Dr. Muna, and all of this evidence was properly before
the jury.

The jury exercised its prerogative to decide

which evidence to believe and did so in favor of Gull
Laboratories.
CONCLUSION
1.

There was no error committed by the court

below in receiving Exhibit P-13 in evidence.
2.

Even if Exhibit P-13 was inadmissible as

evidence, only harmless error was committed because the
evidence contained therein was properly before the jury in
another form.
3.

Ordinary prudence would have enabled Roser

Company to know upon what facts Gull Laboratories based its
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claim for relief.
4.

The evidence was sufficient to justify the

verdict and the damages awarded were not excessive.
DATED this

//p

THday

of

I

u

N 1=

1978.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHMAN, WRIGHT & WILKINS
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GLEN M. RICHMAN
Attorney for Respondent
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